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be sustained
because proper instructions were not
requested."
v.
sttpra, 27 Cal.2d
176.)
Since the facts revealed
the
entirely
circumstantial in
show the case to be a very close one
we must
on the questions of
sanity, and
conclude that the numerous errors reviewed herein substantially and prejudicially affected the
of defendant .
.Accordingly, a reversal is necessary to
a uue>v<uL
of justice.
The judgment and the order denying defendant's motion
for a new trial are reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Schauer

concurred.

Spence, J., concurred in the judgment.

[L. A. No. 22934.

In Bank.

Mar. 31, 1954.]

ROY D. PRICE, .Appellant, v. THE .ATCHISON, TOPEKA
.AND S.ANT .A FE RAIL W .AY CO MP.ANY (a Corporation), Respondent.
[1] Courts-Jurisdiction-Transitory Actions.-The rule of forum
non conveniens is an equitable one embracing discretionary

power of a court to decline to exercise tho jurisdiction it has
over a transitory cause of action when it believes that the
action may be more appropriately and justly tried elsewhere.
[2] Master and Servant-Federal
Liability Act-Jurisdiction.-In refusing to exercise jurisdiction under the doctrine
of forum non conveniens a state may not, by reason of privileges
and immunities clause of federal Constitution (art. IV, § 2),
allow suits in its courts by its own nonresident citizens for liability under Federal Employers' Liability Act
out of
conduct outside that state and discrirninatorily deny access to
its courts to a nonresident who is a citizen of another state;
but if a state chooses to prefer residents in access to often
overcrowded eourts and to deny such access to all nonresidents, whether its own citizens or those of other states, it is a
choice within its own control.
[1] See
Courts, § 228 et seq.
[2] Power of state or state eourt to decline
of action
under Federal Employers' Liability Act, note, 158 A.L.R. 1022.
See, also, Am.Jur., Master and Servant, § 455.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3, 8] Courts, § 24; [2, 4, 7] Master
and Servant,§ 204; [5, 6] Courts,§ 24; Master and Servant,§ 204.
42 C.2d-19 ·

'L & S. l''· l1Y. Co.

C.2d

Actions.---Califomia courts
over
of
citizens of
whether based
a statute of n sister state or a statute
that !aw of sister state is not in
direct conflict with exp1·ess
policy
of California and i~ not <oo"1trary to fundamental principles
of justice or
morals or injmious to welfare of the people.
[ 4] Master and Servant- Federal
Liability ActJurisdiction.-California courts accept jurisdiction of Federal
Ad eases both as to causes of
action which arise in this state and as to those which arise
outside state in fa \'Or of nonresident noncitizen plaintiffs
against a
corporation
business in this state.
[5] Courts-Jurisdiction- Transitory Actions: Master and Servant-Federal
Liability Act---Jurisdiction.-California has no poliey, either statutory or eourt made, of discrimination against either noneitizens of this state or against
Federal Employers' LiDbility Aet aetions in determining when
a nonresident of thic; state will be given access to state courts
to litigate a cause of action which arose elsewhere. (Disapproving any contrary implications in Schultz v. Union Pacific
R. R. Co., llK
169, 2:")7 P.2d 1003.)
[6] !d.-Jurisdiction--Transitory Actions: Master and ServantFederal Employers' J_.iability Act- Jurisdiction.-Upon a
proper showing and without discrimination against either
noncitizens of California or against Federal Employers' LiaAct ca~l·s, the doctrin'l of forttm non cowceniens is available in this state.
[7] Master and Servant- Federal Employers' Liability ActJurisdiction.--Although there is no statutory authorizntion
foT transfer of Federnl I£mployers' Liability Act cases by state
courts, ::md
under doctrine of
non conveniens
a cause arising outside California will be dismissed rather
than transferred, the injustices and burdens on loeal courts
and taxpayers, as well as on those leaving their work and
business to serve as
which can follow from an unchecked
and unregulated importation of transitory causes of action
for trial in this state, require that our courts, acting on equitable principles and within limitations imposed by
and immunities clause of federal ConsLitution (art. IV, 2),
exercise their discretionary power to decline to proceed in
those causes of action which
conclude, on satisfactory evidence, may be more appropriately and justly tried elsewhere.
[8] Courts-Jurisdiction-Transitory Acts.-If plaintiff chooses
without justification to bring his action under circumstances
warranting application o£ doctrine of forum non conveniens
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it is a deliberate risk assumed
him and he must be preparPd
to meet any losses sustained as a result, including that of bar
of his rights
statutes of limitation.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Roy L.
Judge. Affirmed in part
and reversed in part.
Action under Federal Employers' Liability Act for damages for personal injuries. Judgment of dismissal reversed
as to one cause of action; affirmed as to other cause of action.
Hildebrand, Bills & McLeod and D. W. Brobst for Appellant.
Robert W. Walker, Frederic .l1.. Jacobus and J. H. Cummins
for Respondent.
SCHAUER, J.-'l'his case presents the question of the avaiTability in California of the doctrine offontrn non conveniens as
a ground for refusal by a court to exercise jurisdiction over
a cause of action which arose outside the state's boundaries.
"vVe have concluded that upon a proper showing and within
the limitations imposed
the privileges and immunities clause
of the federal Constitution (art. IV, § 2) the doctrine may be
apphed m tlns state.
Plaintiff filed this action in the superior court in Los Angeles, under the
of the Pederal Employers' Liability Act ( 45 u.S. C.A. § 51 et seq.), hereinafter termed the
FELA, to recoyer for personal injuries allegedly sustained by
him on two different occasions while employed by defendant
railroad company in interstate commerce. Both accidents ocCUlTed in New 1\Iexico.«> Defendant answered with a general
denial, and also pleaded
negligence by plaintiff, 1
and a settlement and release agreement made with plaintiff
in New Mexico with respect to the first accident. Defendant
further pleaded a special defense based on the doctrine of
fortlrn non
and in addition moved under that doctrine to diflmiss the complaint. F'ollowing a hearing, the trial
court granted defendant's motion, judgment of dismissal was
entered accordingly, and this
by plaintiff followed.
From the pleadings and affidavits upon which defendant's
motion to dismiss was based, the following facts appear:
•

•

•

1!@1;

'In diminution of damages under the comparative negligence doctrine
applicable to FEL.A actions. ( 45 U.S.C ..A. § 53.)
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was a resident anfl citizen of the State of New Mexico
both at the time of the accidents and when this action was
in Los
Defendant is a Kansas corporation
business in both New
and
All of the
witnesses to
accidents reside
New Mexico rather than in
this state. In order to defend the action
defendto
at

for thdr
treated
in New Mexico. It was uncertain, howeYer, whether any of the doctors would find it possible to leave
their
a trial in Los
and if not then
to present their testimonies by
at the loss of the
of their personal
appearance as 1vitnesses. Defendant estimated that the trial
·would last
fin~ to seven days and that the total
extra cost of
the action in Los Angeles rather than
would be
During the years 1947
Hl<:H<•cur.L~ Oetober
1952, the firm of attorneys
action for
filed in the superior court
in Los
67 actions against defendant based upon
in otl1er states under the F'ELA, and
cases in the federal district courts
in this state. None of the aboye related facts are denied by
plaintiff or his counsel.
As declared in Leet v. Union Pew. R. R. Co. (1944), 25
609
P.2d
158 A.L.R. 1008], "The rule of
nonconveniens is an equitable one embracing the diseretionary power of a court to decline to exercise the jurisdiction it has over a
cause of aetion when it believes
that the action before it may be more appropriately and justly
tried elsewhere.
And in
Oil
v. Gilbert (1947),
330 ·c.S. 501.
S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed. 1055, 1062], it is
statnd that ''As formulated
:Mr. Justice
the rule
is: ' . . . Courts of
and of law also occasionally decline,
in the interest of
to exercise jurisdiction, where the
suit is between aliens or non-residents or where for kindDed
reasons the
can more appropriately be conducted in
tribunal.' Canada
Co., Ltd., v. Paterson
Lid.
, 285 U.S. 413, 422, 423 [52 S.Ct. 413,
76 hEel. 837] . . . . The
of foTum non conveniens is
simply that a eourt may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction
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even when

is authorized
the letter of a
opmwn
cases cited in
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v.
(1941), 314 U.S.
55
S.Ct. 6, 86 hEd.
136 A.L.H.
1222] .) It is conceded that under section 6 of the FELA
U.S.C.A. § 56 2 ) the California court has
of both
the subject matter and the
involved in this action.
In the Leet case we held that a court of this state
jurisdiction over an action under the .B1 ELA could not refuse
to exercise it. Our
was based
upon our
view that the decision of the United States Supreme Court
in Miles v. Illino·is Central R. B. Co. (1942), 315 U.S. 698 [62
S.Ct. 827, 86 I.~.Ed. 1129], was "
decisive that the
doctrine of
nonconveniens is no justification for a state
court to refuse
of an action under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act.
it is conclusive that the
state court 1n11st take jurisdiction. It has no choice in the
matter and no rule or policy on its part alters the situation
[pp. 612-613 of 25
. . . From the foregoing it is clear
that the California court had jurisdiction to
with the
trials of the above entitled causes and was required to exercise
such jurisdiction. [P. 616] . . . " It now appears, however,
that since our decision in the Leet case the United States Supreme Court has considered the question in Southern R. Co.
v.lliayfield (1950), 340 U.S. 1
S.Ct. 1, 95 L.Ed. 3, 6], and
has declared that the Miles case did not limit ''the power of a
State to deny access to its courts to persons seeking recovery
under the Pederal Employers' Liability Act if in similar cases
the State for reasons of local policy denies resort to its courts
and enforces its policy impartially . . . so as not to involve a
discrimination against Employers' Liability Act suits and not
to offend against the Privileges-and-Immunities Clause of the
Constitution,'' and that if a state court held to the contrary
"because it felt under compulsion of federal law as enunciated
by this Court so to hold, it should be relieved of that compulsion.'' The court further expressly recognized the power of
each state ''According to its own notions of procedural policy
2
Section 56: ''No action shall be maintained under this chapter unless
commenced within three years from the day the canRe of action accrued.
''Under this chapter an action may be brought in a district court of
the United States, in the district of the residence of the defendant, or in
which the cause of action arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing
business at the time of commencing such action. The jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States under this chapter shall be concurrent with
that of the courts of the several States.''

582

T. & S. Ji'. RY. Co.

[42 C.2d

as it may
the doctrine [of
non
for all causes of action begun in its courts,'' inthose
under the ];'ELA, so long as it discriminates against neither citizens of sister states nor FELA actions.
In other words, as declared in the Mayfield case, in
refusing to exercise jurisdiction under the doctrine of forum
non
a state may
by reason of the privileges and
immunities clause of the federal Constitution
IV, § 2),
allow suits in its courts by its own nonresident citizens ''for
liability under the ]'ederal Employers' Liability Act arising
out of conduct outside that State and discriminatorily deny
access to its courts to a non-resident who is a citizen of another
State. But if a State chooses to '[prefer] residents in access
to often overcrowded Courts' and to deny such access to all
non-residents, whether its own citizens or those of other States,
it i,; a choice within its own control. This is true also of actions
for personal injuries under the Employers' Liability Act.
Douglas v. New J7 ark, N. II. & H. R. Co. [1929], 279 U.S. 377,
387
S.Ct. 355, 73 L.Ed 747]. Whether a State makes such
a choice is, like its acceptance or rejection of the doctrine of
non conveniens, a question of State law not open to
review" by the Vnited States Supreme Court, provided the
state ''enforces its
impartially . . . so as not to involve
a discrimination against Employers' Liability Act suits and
not to offend against the Privileges-and-Immunities Clause of
the Constitution.'' (Pp. 3-4 of 340 U.S.) In the Douglas ease
the court declared (p. 387 of 279 U.S.), '"I'here are manifest
reasons for preferring residents in access to often overcrowded
Courts, both in convenience and in the fact that broadly speaking it is they who pay for maintaining the Courts concerned.''
[3] It is unquestioned that the courts of this state have
accepted and exercised jurisdiction over transitory causes of
action, which arose outside of California in favor of citizens
of other jurisdictions, nonresident in California, whether based
on the common-law or a statute of a sister state or a statute
of the United States (see Schultz v. Union Pac1>jic R. R. Co.
(1953), 118 Cal.App.2c1169, 178 [257 P.2d 1003], and authorities cited in footnote 17, 118 Cal.App.2d 178), provided the
law of the sister state is not in direct conflict with the express
provisions of the law or the public policy of California and
is not contrary to fundamental principles of justice or good
morals, or injurious to the welfare of the people. (Lomnger
v. Nadcan (1932), 215 Cal. 362, 366 [10 P.2d 63, 84 A.L.R.
1264]; Hudson v. Von IIamm (1927), 85 Cal.App. 323, 326-
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331
; Thome v. Jllacken (1943), 58 CaL<\pp.2d
76
.)
California courts have also aceepted jurisdiction of FEI1A eases both as to causes of action
which arose in this
and as to those vvhieh arose outside
California in favor of nonresident noncitizen
against
a
business in this state. (See Leet v.
Union Pac. R. R. Co. (J
, snpm, 25 Cal.2d 605; Estate of
lV aits (1944), 23 Cal.2d
678-679 [146 P .2d 5].)
[5]'/ It is thus clear that this state has no
either
statutory or court
of diserimination against either nonor against FEIJA actions in determining
citizens of
when a nonresident of this state will be given access to
courts to litigate a cause of action whieh arose
and
any eontrary implications in Schultz v. Union Pacific R. R. Co . .1'
(1953), supra, 118 Cal. A pp.2d 169, 179, 181, are disapproved.
1'he Leet ease, discussed hereinabove, appears to have presented the first instance in which the doctrine of
non
conveniens has been considered and discussed by this court,
and as already mentioned we rejeeted it in connection with
the FELA litigation there involved because of our belief that
we were so compelled by the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in the Miles ease. [6] But since that court,
in the Mayfield case, has now lifted that compulsion (if it ever
intended any), we perceive no reason why the doctrine should
not be available in this state, upon a proper showing and without discrimination against either noncitizens of California or
against FEL,\ cases.
So far as concerns the FELA,
in 1948 empo1Yered the federal district courts to
transfer ''any civil action,'' including those based on the
VEIJA, to any other district or division where it might have
hePn brought ''for the eonvenience of parties and witnesses,
in the interest of jnstice." (28 U.S.C.A. § 1404; see Ex parte
Collett (1949), 337 TT.S. 55 [69 S.Ct. 944,959,93 L.Ecl.l207, 10
A.I;.R.2d 921]; Boud v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co. (1949),
838 U.S. 263 /70 S.Ct. 26, 94 L.Ed. 55] ; Pope v . .Atlantic
Coast Line R. Co. (1953), 345 U.S. 379 [73 S.Ct. 749, 97
L.Ed. 1094] .) Although there is no statutory authorization for snch transfer
state courts, and although under
the cloctrine of
non com,cn·iens a cause arising outside
California vl'ill he dismissed rather than transferred, we are
of the view tl1at the injustices and the burdens on local courts
and taxpayer-s, ns well as on those leaving their work and business to serve as jurors, which can follow from an unchecked
and unregulated importation of transitory causes of action
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discussion 35 Cal.L.Rev. 402-415)
that our
upon the
principles
and within the constitutional limits
stated, exerpower to decline to proceed in those
on
evidence,
may be more
tried elsewhere. (See
Leet v. Um.on Pac. R. R.
, snpra, 25 CaL2d
609.)
A
would result in the
that a federal
district court situated in California could in the interest of
transfer to another district or division an FELA action
of the
involved state
A~,,~""'~ jurisdiction
over
actions
in those courts. We are persuaded that such a result would be
of neither fairness,
nor
intent when removal power
was bestowed upon the federal district courts.
With
to
situations in which a court is
an action under the doctrine of forum
it was
out in
Oil
v. Gilbert
) , supra, 330 U.S.
in sustaining the power
of a federal district court in New York to dismiss a diversity
of
case based upon a tort which occurred in
Lynchburg, Virginia, 3 that "Many of the states have met
misuse of venue
courts with a discretion to change
the place of trial on various
such as the convenience
of witnesses and the ends of justice. The federal law contains no such express criteria to guide the district court in
its power. But the problem is a very old one
aft'ecting the administration of the courts as well as the
rights of litigants, and both in England and in this country
the common law worked out techniques and criteria for dealing
with it.
"\Visely, it has not been attempted to catalogue the circmnstances which will
or require either grant or
denial of
'fhe doctrine leaves much to the discretion
to ·which
resorts, and experience has
to renounce one's own jurisdicticm so
as to result in many abuses.
''If the combination and weight of factors requisite to
results are difficult to forecast or state, those to be
considered are not difficult to name. An interest to be conand the one
to be most pressed, is the private
'As noted hereinabove, removal power was by statute given to the
federal district courts the following year (1948).
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interest of the
considerations are the
relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of comprocess for attendance of
and the cost of
"""'"Ll""""' attendance of
witnesses; possibility of view
if view would be appropriate to the action; and
that make trial of a case easy,
'l'here may also be questions as
of a
if one is obtained. The
court will
relative advantages and obstacles to fair trial.
It is often said that the plaintiff may not, by choice of an
inconveni(Jlt
'vex,' 'harass,' or 'oppress' the defendant
inflicting upon him expense or trouble not necessary to his own
to pursue his remedy. ~ut unless the
balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's
be disturbed. V
choice of forum should
'' Pactors of public interest also have place in applying
the doctrine. Administrative difficulties follow for courts
when litigation is piled up in congested centers instead of
being handled at its origin.
duty is a burden that
ought not to be
upon the people of a community
which has no relation to the litigation. In cases which touch
the affairs of many
there is reason for holding the
trial in their view and reach rather than in remote parts of
the country where
can learn of it by report only. There
is a local interest in
localized controversies decided
at home.
too, in having the
trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with
the state law that must govern the case, rather than having
a court in some other forum untangle problems in conflict of
laws, and in law foreign to itself.'' In determining that in
applying the doctrine the district court had exercised a sound
discretion, the court noted that defendant was a Pennsylvania
corporation doing business in both Virginia and New York,
and (pp.
that .neither the plaintiff nor any witness,
with the possible
of experts, lived in New York;
that no one connected with plaintiff's side of the case save
counsel for
resided there; that plaintiff's only justification for
trial in New York was the argument, rejected by both the district court and the United States
Supreme Court, that the size of the recovery sought by him
(some $400,000) might more readily "stagger" a jury from
Lynchburg,
than one from New York; that Lynchburg, the source of all proofs for either side, except possibly
experts, was some 400 miles from New York; and that "to
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fix the place of trial at a
where litigants cannot compel
personal attendance and may be forced to try their cases on
deposition, is to create a condition not satisfactory to court,
jury or most litigants.''
As already noted hereinabove, in the present case plaintiff
does not controvert the facts alleged by defendant as a basis
for invoking the doctrine of fontm non conveniens. Moreover, the only ground urged by plaintiff for trial in this state
is his claim of an absolute right thereto, a right which, as we
have seen, has been negated by the holding of the United
States Supreme Court in the Mayfield case. Under such circumstances, we are of the opinion that although as in the
Gulf Oil Corp. case (330 U.S. 501, 507-509) from which we
have just quoted, there is no "express [statutory J criteria
to guide the . . . [trial] court in exercising its power,''
nevertheless that court here properly acted within its discretion in granting defendant's motion to dismiss. The
difficulties and inconvenience to defendant, to the court, and
to jurors hearing the case, of attempting to proceed where
witnesses are not amenable to process, and where testimony
may have to be presented by deposition, are apparent. The
added expense to defendant of either attempting to bring
witnesses from New Mexico to Los Angeles or of having to
take their depositions, when not counterbalanced by even a
claim of advantage or convenience to plaintff, was another
factor properly to be taken into consideration. And as already mentioned, the expense and burden resulting to local
taxpayers, courts, and jurors, of providing a forum for the
trial of imported cases also weigh against plaintiff.
[8] The suggestion (although not advanced by plaintiff
here) that the doctrine should not apply because if an action
filed by a nonresident plaintiff is dismissed by the California courts his rights may be barred by limitations statutes
is without merit; if plaintiff chooses without justification to
bring his action under circumstances warranting application
of the doctrine it is a deliberate risk assumed by him and he
must be prepared to meet any losses sustained as a result.
Moreover, as to FELA cases, any such risk could be obviated
by filing in a federal district court, in which the action
would be subject to removal "for the convenience of parties
and witnesses, in the interest of justice,'' rather than to
dismissal (28 U.S.C.A. § 1404). In the present case, however, the statute of limitations will, on February 15, 1954,
have run with respect to the first cause of action and, solely
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in order to avoid on plaintiff's behalf the bar of the statute
of limitations, defendant has entered into a stipulation with
plaintiff that the judgment of the trial court herein shall
be reversed as to the first cause of action. In view of such
stipulation and of tile fact that until this present decision
it had been declared to be the law of this state (in Leet v.
Union Pac. R. R. Co. (1944), supra, 25 Cal.2d 605, 609)
that our courts were compelled to reject the doctrine of
forwn non conveniens with respect to FELA cases, and in
order that as to the first cause of action plaintiff may not
through reliance upon the Leet decision be barred by the
statute of limitations, we have concluded that the judgment
should be reversed as to that cause of action.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, the judgment is reversed as to the first cause of action, and is affirmed as to
the second cause of action, neither party to recover costs
on appeal.
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J.,
concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
'l'he holding of the majority in this case injects into the
law of this state for the first time in its entire judical history
the most monstrous weapon for obstructing the administration of justice ever conceived by any court or judicial tribunal.
'l'his holding places it within the power of a trial court to
dismiss a transitory action which arose out of this state,
even though plaintiff was a citizen of this state, and had a
statutory right to prosecute such an action in the courts of
this stateA This must be so because the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides: "N0
state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States."
Therefore, a statute, or court-made rule of law which would
permit a trial court to dismiss an action brought by a citizen
of another state upon a cause of action arising out of this
state would be invalid unless it was applied eq11ally against
eitizens of this state. (Douglas v. New York, N. H. & H. R.
Go., 279 U.S. 377 !49 S.Ct. 355, 73 L.Ed. 747] .)
-While it may be true that a state could refuse to confer
jurisdiction upon its courts to handle such cases, it may not
deny the privilege to some citizens of the United States and
not to others. We then have this anomalous situation created
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by the majority decision in this case. A citizen of this state
is injured in another state. He commences an action in this
state for redress of such
.1:\ motion to dismiss on
the ground of
non com'cn?,ens JS made. If be resists
the motion he is faced with the
trial and upon an
this
his favor reversed because the trial
such motion. It must then follow
dismissed and in the meantime the statute
run in the state where the cause of aetion
In response
to his outcry against this
the
of this court say to him · ''It is
bad. You should
have guessed what we would do--whenever
don't like
what the trial court
we
say, it abused its discretion
and we reverse its decision."
S.F.
No. 18781, ante, p. 500 [267
12th, 1954; Carroll v.
S.F. No.
p. 874 [267 P.2c1 10371, decided March
1954; Leipet·t
v. Honold, 39 Cal.2d 462
P.2d
29 A.L.R.2d 1185];
Rose v. Melody Lane, 39 Cal.2d 481
P.2d 335]; Car·y
v. Wentzel, 39 Cal.2d 491
P.2d
.Hamasaki v.
Flo tho, 39 Cal.2d 602
P .2d
.)
And so, in effect, the
of the
here means,
that it will never be safe for any citizen of the United States
to prosecute in the courts of this
a cause of action which
arose in another state or
'fhe
risk, first of a judgment of dismissal
a trial
even if he prevails
he is faced with the prospect of a
reversal by this court vvith direction to the trial court to
dismiss the action.
who has had experience
in the trial of cases knows that the ultimate outcome of any
case of this character
upon the
of the members
of the court which has the last say and there can never be
a rule to guide the course which he should pursue. ·
The majority holding is based on two major premises,
and it is not clear which is
here.
the
majority discusses the inconvenience and expense to the defendant to present its defense to the action if tried in Los
Angeles County. Second, the burden upon the courts
people of this state to hear and determine cases of
character. First, since the
has
prosecute such an action in a state court
inconvenience of the defendant, he should not be
such right by a court-made rule. If there is to be a
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by the
and not by the
doctrine of
non conveniens is
that such actions are a burden upon the
courts and the
of this
then all causes of action
out of this state must be barred. Certainly, if it may
be said that causes of action
out of this state are a
burden on
courts and the
of this state, the courts
cannot say that some of such actions may be tried in our courts
and others not.
other
so far as the burden upon
our courts is
must be open to all citizens of
the United States who have such causes of action to prosecute,
or to none at all. Otherwise the privileges and immunities
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is meaningless. Yet the
majority opinion conveys the inference that this latter ground
is also within the diseretion of the court in ruling on a motion
to dismiss on the ground of
non conveniens. Obviously
this cannot be so.
it remains to be seen whether or
not the
cases to which the doctrine is applied by the
majority of this court are those arising under the Federal
Employers'
Act.
The majority concedes that the courts of this state may not
apply the doctrine of
non conveniens discriminately
against Federal
' Liability k~ct cases. In view of
the fact that there are more than 235 superior judges sitting
in the various counties of this state, it is obvious that the doctrine will be
some and not by others in cases of
similar factual
It is far from probable that there
will be any uniformity in its application. Since these cases
constitute by far the
group of out-of-state cases which
are prosecuted in our courts it is not unlikely that they will
be the only cases in which the doctrine is applied. But how
and when may this be determined~ Must a plaintiff have to
wait one, two or more years and then make an examination
of the register of actions in all of the superior courts of this
state in order to determine whether or not there has been discrimination against this class of cases? .At this writing the
task of showing such discrimination would seem to me to be an
impossible burden to place upon any litigant or group of litigants, especially
working men who are seeking redress
for their injuries under the Federal Employers' Liability .Act .
.And yet, the majority of this court, in utter disregard of these
considerations, announces a rule here which can only result
in depriving the plaintiffs in Federal Employers' Liability .Act
courts.
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cases, arising out of this state, from seeking redress in the
courts of this state pursuant to the provisions of said act.
It may be reminiscent of a few decades ago that the railroad
companies have been able to accomplish through the majority
decision in this case what they have been unable to accomplish
through the legislative and executive branches of both the state
and federal governments. .At the 1953 session of the California
Legislature two bills were introduced which purported to incorporate the doctrine of forum non conveniens into the law of
this state. These bills were Senate Bills No. 789 and 1960.
They passed both houses of the Legislature and Senate Bill
No. 789 was vetoed by the then Governor Earl Warren, now
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. In
his veto message on this bill he stated: "If we are to whittle
away in this manner the benefits conferred by the Federal Employers' Liability .Act, it would soon lose its national uniformity and could at least substantially weaken the purposes for
which the act was originally designated. I am not advised that
other states have enacted such legislation. The fact that this
act has been in effect since 1908 without similar legislation
being enacted in other states would indicate a nationwide
appreciation of the desirability for this uniformity. .At all
events if any of the provisions of the act result in a denial
of justice to either plaintiffs or defendants, the situation could
be remedied nationwide by a simple act of Congress." Senate
Bill No. 1960 was passed during the closing days of the legislative session and did not become effective because of lack of
executive approval.
It appears from the Congressional Record that at the time
Congress enacted section 1404(a) (28 U.S.C.A.), which in
effect incorporated the doctrine of forum non conveniens in
federal courts, it refused to enact a bill which would have
amended section 6 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act by
limiting the employee's choice of venue to the place of his injury or to the place of his residence. The language used by
Governor Warren in his veto message on Senate Bill No. 789 is
almost the precise language used by the Supreme Court of the
United States in the very recent case of Pope v. Atlantic Coast
LineR. Co., 345 U.S. 379 [73 S.Ct. 749, 97 L.Ed. 1094], where
that court held that a nonresident could not be foreclosed from
filing an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
In that case the Supreme Court said: ''Congress might have
gone further; it might have vested state courts with the power
asserted here. In fact, the same Congress which enacted
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§ 1404 (a) [re forum non conveniens in federal courts] refused
to enact a bill which would have amended § 6 of the Federal
Employers' Liability Act by limiting the employee's choice of
venue to the place of his injury or to the place of his residence.
"This proposed amendment-the Jennings Bill-focused
Congress' attention on the decisions of this Court in both the
Miles and the Kepner cases. The broad question-involving
many policy considerations-of whether venue should be more
narrowly restricted, >vas reopened; cogent arguments-both
pro and con-were restated. Proponents of the amendment
asserted that, as a result of the Miles and Kepner decisions,
injured employees were left free to abuse their venue rights
under § 6 and 'harass' their employers in distant forums without restriction. They insisted that these abuses be curtailed.
These arguments prevailed in the House, which passed the
,Jennings Bill, but the proposed amendment died in the Senate
.Judiciary Committee, and § 6 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act was left just as this Court had construed it."
The Jennings Bill was the same type of bill as Senate Bill
No. 1960. Had the Congress of the United States intended
that the jurisdiction in federal employers' liability cases was
to be restricted to the states where the cause of action arose
or where the plaintiff resided it would have enacted the J ennings Bill. The Congressional Record discloses that in recent
years several attempts have been made by the railroad companies to induce Congress to adopt similar bills and each of
such attempts has resulted in failure. This should constitute
conclusive evidence that the statute as it now exists does not
work an undue hardship upon the railroad companies affected
by its provisions or is out of harmony with considerations of
justice underlying the basic concept of the Federal Employers'
I~iability Act.
On May 2d, 1953, the District Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, in its decision in Schultz v.
Union Pac. R. Co., 118 Cal.App.2d 169 [257 P.2d 1003], after
an exhaustive review of all of the authorities followed the decision of the Pope case and again stated that the jurisdiction
conferred by the Federal Employers' Liability Act should not
be interfered with by the courts or by state legislation. In the
Schultz case the District Court of Appeal said: "The Congress
having given the right under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act to an injured party to maintain an action for damages in
the courts of the district where the defendant is doing business
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at the time the suit is
the
of venue thus
granted cannot be frustrated for reasons of convenience or
expense. "\Ve are not concerned with the
or the wisdom
of such legislation. The
of
the laws passed by the
legislative enactments or to
laws because
given rise to consequences which may not
been contemplated by the Congress, no matter how
tl1e results." "We
hold that the courts of California may
with
the Constihdion of the United
decline on the basis of
of an action under
forum non conveniens to take
the Federal Employers'
founded on a cause of
a non-citizen
action which arose without the
and non-resident against a
business
within the state.'' This court denied the
of the railroad company for a hearing in that case and it
the
law of this state until today when the
of this court
by its decision in the case at bar
disapproved the
Schultz case.
Since this court decided Leet v. Um:on Pac. R.
25 Ca1.2d
605 [155 P.2d 42, 158 A.I,.R.
, relying upon Miles v.
Illinois Central R.
315 U.S. 698
S.Ct. 827, 86 L.Ed
1129], and Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. J[epner, 314 U.S. 44
[62 S.Ct. 6, 86 L.Ed 28], holding that a state court has no
'
power to refuse to exercise jurisdiction in a federal
liability case by use of the doctrine of
nonconveniens or
otherwise, the United States
Court ignored those
340 U.S. 1 [71
cases in deciding Southern R. Co. v.
S.Ct. 1, 95 L.Ed. 3]. The court held in the
case that
a state court could refuse to determine a federal employers'
liability case under the doctrine of
non conveniens as
long as it treated all
actions and
and noncitizens of the state similarly. In a later case the court held
that the courts of the state in which the
occurred and
in which plaintiff was a resident could not, in an action by
the railroad, enjoin plaintiff from maintaining a federal employers' liability action in the court of another state although
the latter state court was not a convenient forum. The basis
of the holding was that the Federal
' Liability Act
(45 U.S.C.A. §56) gave the injured person a right to sue in
the latter court and the former court could not take it away.
(Pope v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 345 U.S. 379 [73 S.Ct.
749, 97 I1.Ed. 1094].) Tl1e court further held that the amendment to the federal law (28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a)) authorizing
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433 [53 P.2d1011]; Paras v. Lower
California Dev.
688 [151 P. 35] ; Roberts v.
75 Cal. 203
P.
; Loranger v. Nadea~~, 215
P.2d63, 84 A.L.R.
; Hudson v. Von Hamm,
85 Cal.App. 323 [259 P.
. ) As expressed in Loranger v.
supm, 215 Cal. 362, 366: "It is the general rule in
tort actions that the court
if it has ;jurisdiction of the
necessary parties, and can do substantial justice between them
in accordance with its ovvn forms of procedure, enforce the
foreign law, if it is not contrary to the public policy of the
forum, to abstract justice or pure morals, or injurious to the
welfare of the people of the state of the forum . . . In Loucks
v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99 [120 N.E. 198, 202], it was
said : 'The courts are not free to refuse to enforce a foreign
right at the pleasure of judges, to sttit the individual notion
of
or
'l'hey do not close their doors, unless
help would violate some fundamental principle of justice, some
prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weaL' In Reynolds v. Day, 79 ·wash. 499
[hR.A. 1916A, 432, 140 Pac. 681], it was said: 'Under the
rule of comity, rights vvhich have accrued by the law of another
state or nation are treated as valid everywhere. When the
action is transitory and the jurisdiction of the parties can
be obtained by service of process, the foreign law, if not contrary to the public policy of the state where the action is
brought, nor contrary to abstract justice or pure morals, nor
calculated to injure the state or its citizens, will be recognized
and enforced. This rule applies to actions ex contmcht and
actions ex delicto. In all cases, the right to recover is govenwrl by the lex loci, and not by the lex fori.' " (Emphasis
added.) \Vith respect to the duty of our courts to enforce
federally created rights (the Federal Employers' Liability
Act is such), this court, contrary to the majority opinion,
considers it their mandatory duty and is not concerned with
the imagined overcrowding of our courts \Vith such cases.
In JJ1ille1· v. JJ1nnicipal Conrt, 22 Cal.2il 818 [142 P.2d 297],
we had before us the question of whether the state municipal
court was required to enforce the federal emergency price
control law. \Ve held that it was, stating: ''As Congress
in the lawful exercise of a constitutional power, by its
statutes declares the policy for both the people and the states
Second Employers' Liability Cases, supra, p. 57), so
does it declare the policy of the people and of the states
with regard to the enforcement of a law such as the Emer-
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gency Price Control Act of 1942. In enforcing that act by
assuming jurisdiction of a consumer action pursuant to congressional mandate, in the course of the exercise of its ordinary jurisdiction, a state court is not entertaining an action
created by a totally unrelated sovereign, but is merely yielding to the superior exercise of a lawful right granted Congress
by the United States Constitution.
'' . . . But, considering the intent of the framers of the
Constitution, the acts of the early Congresses, and the provisions of article VI establishing the supremacy of federal
law, it seems clear that a state court, otherwise competent
to exercise jurisdiction over the subject-matter, the parties,
and the amount in controversy, must assume jurisdiction of
an action created by federal law enacted pursuant to a legitimate federal function, . . .
''Any argument of hardship which, it may be asserted,
will result from the additional burden of litigation in state
courts, must be considered settled by the Supreme Court of
the United States. 'vVe are not disposed,' the court observed,
'to believe that the exercise of jurisdiction by the state courts
will be attended by any appreciable inconvenience or confusion; but, be this as it may, it affords no reason for declining jurisdiction conferred by law. The existence of the jurisdiction creates an implication of duty to exercise it, and
that its exercise may be onerous does not militate against that
implication.' " (Emphasis added; Miller v. Municipal Court,
22 Cal.2d 818, 850-851 [142 P.2d 297] .) Thus there is no
basis for the comments in the majority opinion about the
supposed burden of determining transitory actions. It is
the fixed policy of this state to enforce at least federally
created rights without regard to convenience. Unless the
Miller case is overruled the majority opinion cannot stand ;
in any event, any repudiation of it should be done by the
l1egislature, not by this court.
The difficulty of stating properly the circumstances under
which the doctrine should or shonld not result in dismissal
(later discussed), is an additional reason why it should not
be adopted-why it is more appropriately a legislative problem. Questions of venue to which the present problem is
analogous have been traditionally a legislative or constitutional matter. (People v. Zegras, 29 Cal.2d 67 [172 P.2d
883]; San .Jose I. & C. Storage Co. v. San Jose, 19 Cal.App.
2d 62 [64 P.2d 1099] ; Perkins v. Winder, 123 Cal.App. 467
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down by different courts
is
thus bound to rise over
"A district
in United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co.
with the
stated:
'' ' . . . To
niceties
in halthe relative conveniences and inconveniences of all
resort must be had
to any
's scale
a
ball; neither of which
are available to this court.'
"Utter confusion is
in the law. . . .
''The courts have all taken the attitude in cases decided
under Section
that
set standard or policy can
attitude of the courts is rebe
v.
w.
[89
of defendant for
seeks "a clarification of the policy of the Court with respect to cases of
this character brought
it in the Northern District
of Ohio.'' Let it be
understood that the Court is
~~fu

~

~

a slide rule to enable them to calculate with mathematical
precision the result that will be reached on motions to transfer
that may be filed in other cases. All cases will be heard and
decided on their
facts. The very
of the statute under which this motion filed
strates the
of this conclusion. The
Court, in
of this
any other case, which
be followed.
be announced is that
it has not been
the
which will
remedy.''
v.
67 S.Ot. 839, 843, 91 L.Ed. 1055.'
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''The widespread confusion in the law resulting from the
present more or less universal practice of filing either motions
to transfer or dismiss has reacted to the special disadvantage
of railroad men caused to suffer injuries not fatal or permanently crippling and especially when injury occurred in
sparsely settled communities, and when the injured employee
resides at a railroad point or division where it is impossible
to obtain competent counsel or to have the case tried and
heard in a court experienced in trials of this class. The threat
of using and employing these motions is a form of mental
coercion or compulsion decidedly advantageous to the railroad
and disadvantageous to the employee. Many lawyers will not
undertake the prosecution of these cases knowing of the difficulties and the expense, time, and effort of trying in effect
several lawsuits. Therefore, the railroads are able to settle,
especially in this western country, this class of cases on their
own terms . . . . " (Parnell Black and John L. Black, InjusUces in the Federal Forum Non Conveniens Rule, 3 Utah L.
Rev. 314, 317-320; see, also, 41 Cal.L.Rev. 507; 38 Va.L.Rev.
569.)
Substantial authority in other states has rejected the doctrine. (See cases collected, 35 Cal.L.Rev. 380, 388.)
Assuming the doctrine is available, difficult problems develop, such as the circumstances relevant to whether a dismissal is proper, the review of the trial court's determination
of the question, and the injustices inherent in its application.
Among the circumstances justifying a dismissal the majority opinion relies heavily on the inconvenience to our courtscongested calendars and the use of our courts by nonresidents.
I have above pointed out that this factor can have no significance in view of our decision in Miller v. Municipal Court,
supra, 22 Cal.2d 818. In addition to that, however, the federal courts have not considered it is a factor in applying the
transfer provisions of the federal law which are based on
convenience. It is stated with supporting authority that:
"However, a striking demonstration of the novelty in the
new federal doctrine of forum non conveniens based on
1404 (a) is that inconvenience to the court appears to play
no part in the exercise of discretion to transfer. The most
crowded district court in the nation, that of the Southern
District of New York, has retained cases (some of which
promised large expenditures of time and effort) without considering its own convenience in its ascertainment of the most
suitable forum. A similar course has been followed by other
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burdened courts. On the other
cases have been transferred from current or relatively uncrowded dockets to overburdened courts which were more convenient for litigants and
witnesses.
''The language of some opinions seems to indicate that convenience to the court is indeed an important factor under
1404 (a), but an analysis of the facts meriting transfer in
these cases indicates that convenience to the court was really
unimportant." (Factors of Choice for Venue Transfer Under
28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a), 41 Cal.L.Rev. 507, 518-519.)
The majority opinion states that whether the statute of
limitations may have run pending the commencement of the
action in a state court and its proposed dismissal, is not a
circumstance to be considered; that plaintiff takes and should
take the risk of choosing the right forum. This is indeed
harsh. He is forced to speculate not only on how the trial
court may decide the question but also what the views of an
appellate court may be. As evident from the confusion in
the federal case above discussed, such an impossible burden
should not be placed upon him. Suppose a case where the
location of the witnesses is equally divided between the state
of the chosen forum and another or other factors are equally
balanced, the plaintiff has no means of predicting the .court's
decision. He is left at the mercy of the defendant-must
have his prior approval of a particular court. Plaintiff having· the right to have a particular court exercise its jurisdiction, and that court having jurisdiction, should be able to
have the dismissal denied in any case where the statute of
limitations will have run by the time that issue is finally
determined. As said by a writer on the subject: "And all
cases hold that jurisdiction must be assumed if the defendant
is not subject to process, or the statnte of limitations has rnn,
in the state that he claims is more appropriate." (Emphasis
added; Barrett, The Doctrine of Forttm Non Conveniens,
35 Cal.L.Rev. 380, 419-420.)
The review on appeal of the trial court's decision on the
motion to dismiss presents many problems. If the motion
is denied it would be an interlocutory order and not appealable but would be reviewable on the appeal from the judgment. If plaintiff had obtained judgment the case would
have, of course, been tried with all the expense, time and
inconvenience of witnesses involved. Yet presumably the
appellate court could reverse the judgment because it thought
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it could, and
embrace rules of procedure
to guide the courts in the application of such doctrine. The
majority here appear to be oblivious to these considerations.
For the foregoing reasons I would reverse the judgment.

Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied April 28,
1954. Carter,
was of the
that the petition should
be granted.

such conditions as the court in its discretion deems ;just and reasonable,
but, in any event, such interlocutory order shall :require that there be
filed in the action a written agreement executed by the moving defendant
and such other defendants as the court shall determine, which agreement
as to each such defendant shall contain
''(a) Such stipulations as may be necessary to provide effectively that
plaintiff may bring and maintain an action upon the same cause of
action in such jurisdiction or jurisdictions as the court shall determine or,
if such action cannot be brought and maintained in any such jurisdiction,
that the interlocutory order and any final dismissal shall be vacated and
that the time within which the action must be brought to trial shall
eommcnce on the date when the interlocutory order or dismissal is so
vacated; and
"(b) Such stipulations as may be necessary to suspend effectively all
stntutes of limitations which have not expired at the time the action was
commenced for a period sufficient to make effective the provisions of the
foregoing subdivision (a) which period shall be not less than 180 days
after the dismissal shall become final; and
" (c) Such stipulations as may be necessary to assure that the moving
defendant, and such other defendants as the court shall determine, will
voluntarily make a general appearance in, or !Je subject to the process of
a comt in the jurisdiction or jurisdictions determined by the court as
provided in subdivision (a).
"Upon proof that the conditions of the interlocutory order have been
performed within the time allowed, the court, upon motion, shall thereupon enter a judgment of dismissal. Ii' the eonditions are not performed,
the court, upon motion, shall vacate the interlocutory order and enter
an order den;·ing the motion or make such other order as is just. An
interlocutory order hereunder is an appealable order.
'' Tlle party making the motion shall have the burden of proof that
the r.nnse of action did not arise within this State, that a court of this
8tate is not n convenient forum for the parties and witnesses and that
dismissnl will serve the interests of justice.''

